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Corporate Mobile Security Isn’t Cutting It

News and articles about cyber security, information security, vulnerabilities, exploits, patches, releases, software, features, hacks, laws, spam, viruses, malware, trojans. Let’s get right to the point immediately. It’s almost as if corporations have blinders on regarding some aspects of.... (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 4:52 pm


Report Finds New Deficiencies in IRS Data Security Security Controls

The Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) information system security controls require further improvements, a new report from the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) claims. An audit of the IRS’ fiscal years 2018 and 2017 financial statements revealed that the agency maintained.... (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 3:52 pm


Fake FaceApp Found Delivering MobiDash Adware to Push Unwanted Ads

According to a report by Kaspersky, around 500 unique users have encountered the problem within the last 48 hours. MobiDash is an adware which, if installed on a machine, starts to display unwanted ads that can annoy users. Cybercriminals are leveraging fake versions of FaceApp to deliver MobiDash adware. (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 3:33 pm


Building Resilience to Foreign Interference, Misinformation Activities

Original release date: July 22, 2019As part of the effort to #Protect2020, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is working with national partners to build resilience to foreign interferences, particularly information activities (… Original release date: July 22, 2019 As part.... (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 3:19 pm


Europe and US issue new cyber security resources

The European Network for Cyber Security and DSO association E.DSO have issued guidelines for smart meter cyber security requirements. Smart meter security has become a priority as European countries work towards an EU goal of 80% smart meter penetration by 2020 where it is cost-effective to do so. (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 3:04 pm


Iranian Hackers Send Out Fake LinkedIn Invitations Laced With Malware

U.S. cybersecurity firm FireEye has warned of a malicious phishing campaign that it has attributed to the Iranian-linked APT34—whose activity has been reported elsewhere as OilRig and Greenbug. The campaign has been targeting LinkedIn users with plausible but bogus invitations to join a professional.... (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 2:53 pm


Man arrested for hacking Bulgaria’s tax agency released with reduced charges

The man accused of breaching Bulgaria’s tax agency has been released and charged on lesser counts. Kristian Boykov 20-year-old Bulgarian cybersecurity worker was arrested in Sofia, Bulgaria, last week on a charge of computer crime against critical infrastructure, which carries a maximum sentence of.... (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 1:45 pm


How to steal a million (of your data)

Any user data — from passwords for entertainment services to electronic copies of documents — is highly prized by intruders. The reason is simply that almost any information can be monetized. For instance, stolen data can be used to transfer funds to cybercriminal accounts, order goods or services,.... (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 1:45 pm


US Homeland Security - “A High Risk to Their Users”: An Analysis of Huawei Devices’ Security Vulnerabilities

Western intelligence services have long suspected that the Chinese communication giant Huawei was a tool of China’s powerful intelligence services. An analysis of the state of security of Huawei’s gear and equipment has found serious security flaws and vulnerabilities. (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 1:45 pm


ProFTPD Vulnerability Can Expose Servers to Attacks

News and articles about cyber security, information security, vulnerabilities, exploits, patches, releases, software, features, hacks, laws, spam, viruses, malware, trojans. A security hole affecting the free and open source ProFTPD file transfer protocol (FTP) server can be exploited to copy files.... (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 11:50 am


Tricking attackers through the art of deception

In cybersecurity, deception is redundant if it cannot fulfill its critical aim – to misdirect, confuse, and lure attackers into traps and dead-ends. It is the art of tricking attackers into overextending and exposing themselves. To deceive attackers, an organization’s security team must see things from the adversary’s perspective. (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 11:33 am


Lancaster University students’ data stolen by cyber-thieves

. Posted on Author Cyber Security Review Students’ personal data has been stolen in a “sophisticated and malicious” phishing attack at Lancaster University. Officials said the information had been used to send bogus invoices to applicants. “A very small number” of student records, phone numbers and ID documents were also accessed, it said. (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 9:26 am


FSB Contractor Suffers 7.5TB Breach

According to BBC Russia , a contractor believed to work with the FSB, Russia’s intelligence service, was hacked on July 15, 2019. A group of hackers named 0v1ru$ hacked into SyTech's Active Directory server from where they gained access to the company's entire IT network, including a JIRA instance. This access enabled the hackers to steal 7. (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 8:30 am


Security or compliance? Stop choosing between them

The difference between security and compliance is more than just process. It’s philosophy and practice. Compliance can be one tactical execution of a great security strategy or potentially a bureaucratic check-the-box effort. While security and compliance share similar goals, IT too often meets.... (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 6:01 am


Australians lost $16m to ID theft so far this year

Prompts fresh warning to report incidents. Australians have already lost $16 million to Identity theft and phishing-related scams this year, according to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. The ACCC's deputy chair Delia Rickard urged Australians that had lost money to scammers to report it. (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 4:45 am


ESET unveils new version of File Security for Linux

, a global leader in cybersecurity, has launched Version 7.0 of their ESET File Security for Linux product. ESET File Security for Linux provides advanced protection to organisations’ general servers, network file storage and multipurpose servers. The software ensures the servers are stable and.... (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 3:32 am


The 4 Questions Industrial CISOs Need to Ask When Evaluating a Cybersecurity Tool

News and articles about cyber security, information security, vulnerabilities, exploits, patches, releases, software, features, hacks, laws, spam, viruses, malware, trojans. The 4 Questions Industrial CISOs Need to Ask When Evaluating a Cybersecurity Tool. (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 3:26 am


Proofpoint protects orgs’ most attacked people from phishing, malware, and data loss risk

, a leading cybersecurity and compliance company, announced two people-centric innovations that enhance how organizations protect their most attacked people from malicious URLs, while increasing the effectiveness of security awareness training content. (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 2:38 am


Trial to open for Philippine journalist critical of Duterte

MANILA: High-profile Philippine journalist Maria Ressa's libel trial opens Tuesday (Jul 23) in a case that press freedom advocates see as government retaliation for her news site's critical reporting on President Rodrigo Duterte. Ressa, who leads online outlet Rappler and was named a Time Magazine.... (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 2:34 am


File Copy Vulnerability With ProFTPD puts Over 1 Million Servers at Risk

File copy vulnerability in ProFTPD server allows an anonymous remote attacker to execute the code in vulnerable machine results in remote code execution and information disclosure without authentication. By exploiting the vulnerability attacker can run any program code with the rights of the Pro-FTPd service. (more)

Posted on 23 July 2019 12:51 am


Recent DNS Hijacking Campaigns Trigger Government Action

A recent spate of attacks targeting domain name system protocols and registrars, including several incidents that researchers believe have ties to nation-state espionage, is prompting the U.S. and U.K. governments to issues warnings and policy updates to improve security. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 9:48 pm


Britain waits for U.S. cue before Huawei 5G decision

LONDON - Britain said Monday it was “not yet in a position” to decide what involvement China’s Huawei should have in the U.K.’s 5G next-generation telecom network. Digital Secretary Jeremy Wright told parliament that London was still seeking clarity on the implications of U.S. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 9:40 pm


Reset Email Account Passwords after Website Infection: Follow Up

In a previous analysis of a malicious file , we demonstrated why you should always update your email account passwords after a security compromise. The information security threat landscape is always changing. Likewise, the tools used by bad actors are also evolving to evade detection by and other similar services. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 7:23 pm


Chrome 76 blocks websites from detecting incognito mode

Have you ever bypassed a website paywall using a browser’s privacy mode? It used to be a simple hack to read an article without registering, paying, or logging in to the publisher’s website. However, it will no longer work for most subscription-based websites. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 5:56 pm


Huawei's Czech Unit Secretly Collected Data: Report

The Czech unit of telecoms giant Huawei secretly collected personal data of customers, officials and business partners, Czech public radio reported Monday, fanning concerns about security risks linked to the Chinese group. Two former Huawei managers who spoke on condition of anonymity told the radio.... (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 5:54 pm


Browser Extensions Massively Collecting User Data (SecurityWeek)

Security researchers have discovered eight Chrome and Firefox extensions that leak user data, including personally identifiable information (PII) and corporate information (CI). Referred to as DataSpii (pronounced data-spy), the leak was detected within the internal network environments of several.... (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 4:27 pm


Ex-NSA Contractor Harold Martin Hit With 9-Year Sentence

The NSA's headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland. The curious case of Harold Thomas Martin III appears to have come to a close, although some questions pertaining to the case remain unanswered, at least in public. Martin, 54, is a former government contractor who pleaded guilty to stealing classified and secret material from the U. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 4:17 pm


Huawei allegedly developed a spy-friendly phone network for North Korea

If Huawei was hoping to mend its reputation in the wake of the de facto US ban , it's about to be disappointed. The and 38 North have published joint reports indicating that Huawei helped build Koryolink , North Korea's highly restrictive cellphone network that went live in 2008. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 2:52 pm


Cisco ‘in talks’ to borg with web app protector Signal Sciences for its web app firewall tech

News and articles about cyber security, information security, vulnerabilities, exploits, patches, releases, software, features, hacks, laws, spam, viruses, malware, trojans. Cisco ‘in talks’ to borg with web app protector Signal Sciences for its web app firewall tech. It is but WAF-er thin… – report. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 2:07 pm


Pegasus spyware can now scrape data from servers of Apple, Google, Facebook and Microsoft

The NSO Group - the creator of Pegasus spyware - has been advertising the Pegasus spyware with new capabilities. The malware has now been enhanced to copy authentication keys and access cloud services like Google Drive or iCloud. New details regarding the Pegasus spyware made by the Israel-based NSO Group have emerged recently. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 1:07 pm


Equifax Negotiates Potential $700 Million Breach Settlement

Credit reporting giant Equifax has negotiated a settlement to resolve U.S. federal and state probes into its massive 2017 data breach. See Also: Webinar | The Future of Adaptive Authentication in Financial Services As part of the proposed settlement, Equifax has agreed to pay at least $575 million,.... (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 12:52 pm


Hackers Expose Russian FSB Cyberattack Projects

More nation-state activity in cyberspace, this time from Russia: Per the different reports in Russian media, the files indicate that SyTech had worked since 2009 on a multitude of projects since 2009 for FSB unit 71330 and for fellow contractor Quantum. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 12:24 pm


DealBook Briefing: Chinese Investment in the U.S. Drops 90%

Equifax’s huge hack will cost it $650 million. The credit bureau Equifax is expected to pay around $650 million to settle federal and state investigations and consumer claims relating to a data breach that exposed sensitive information belonging to 145 million people, • Most of the roughly $650.... (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 11:42 am


Released: PoC for RCE flaw in Palo Alto Networks firewalls, gateways

Palo Alto Networks has silently patched a critical remote code execution vulnerability in its enterprise GlobalProtect SSL VPN, which runs on Palo Alto Networks’ firewall devices. Administrators who have still not upgraded to the fixed PAN-OS versions are urged to do so quickly, as researchers have.... (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 11:33 am


Ke3chang APT group linked to Okrum backdoor

ESET researchers linked the Ke3chang APT group to the newly discovered Okrum backdoor showing the group is still active and improving its code. Researchers have since discovered new versions of malware families linked to the Ke3chang group and believe the group is operating out of China. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 10:43 am


7 mobile security threats you should take seriously in 2019

Mobile security is at the top of every company's worry list these days — and for good reason: Nearly all workers now routinely access corporate data from smartphones, and that means keeping sensitive info out of the wrong hands is an increasingly intricate puzzle. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 10:42 am


In Kazakhstan, everyone who wants to use Internet must allow government to read their Secure Traffic (HTTPS)

Providers of Kazakhstan persuade customers to install a "state trusted certificate" on all devices, which will allow intercepting all encrypted traffic of the country in order to protect citizens from cyber threats and illegal content. Kazakhstan Telecom operators have begun to notify customers.... (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 9:47 am


FaceApp opportunities for scammers on fake web and YouTube, Eset finds

One form of the scam uses a fake website that claims to offer a premium version of FaceApp. The second type of scam includes YouTube videos again promoting download links for a "Pro" version. One of the fraudulent YouTube videos had over 150,000 views at the time of writing this research. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 9:12 am


What does a vulnerability verification specialist do?

Lauren McCaslin, vulnerability verification team lead for the Threat Research Center at WhiteHat Security, discusses her path to becoming a vulnerability verification specialist and what it’s like to have a career focused on cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Join us in the fight against cybercrime: https://www. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 9:03 am


Critical Vulnerability in VLC Media Player 3.0.7.1 Let Hackers to Execute Arbitrary Code

Critical Vulnerability Found in the current version of VLC Media Player let hackers execute arbitrary code on the vulnerable machine. German Cybersecurity agency, CERT-Bund, discovered the critical flaw. The vulnerability can be tracked as CVE-2019-13615 , a remote attacker can exploit this.... (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 8:03 am


Iran says it has broken CIA spy ring, some sentenced to death

Dubai: Iran has captured 17 spies working for the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and some have been sentenced to death, Iranian media have reported. State television quoted the Intelligence Ministry as saying on Monday it had broken up a CIA spying ring and captured 17 suspects. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 7:56 am


Google Finds Cheap Way Out of Multibillion-Dollar 'Wi-Spy' Suit

Google is poised to pay a modest $13 million (roughly Rs. 90 crores) to end a 2010 privacy lawsuit that was once called the biggest US wiretap case ever and threatened the Internet giant with billions of dollars in damages. The settlement would close the books on a scandal that was touched off by.... (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 6:41 am


Six System and Software Vulnerabilities to Watch Out for in 2019

Six System and Software Vulnerabilities to Watch Out for in 2019. Wouldn’t it be an easier life if we didn’t have to worry about the exploitation of vulnerabilities in solutions and software on which we have spent good time and resources? A world where correctly configured systems configured were.... (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 6:33 am


How DNS firewalls can burn security teams

On the surface, this research is good news. It suggests there is a low-hanging fruit in the cybersecurity space. But it also suggests that a DNS firewall is the logical next step to improved security. It’s not — at least not on its own. If, as a technology leader, you want to proactively protect.... (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 5:10 am


Trend Micro approved as an SLP Plus endpoint security vendor

, a global leader in cybersecurity solutions, announced its endpoint security products are available for purchase via the California Software Licensing Program (SLP) Plus vehicle. This further validates Trend Micro’s industry leading capabilities and will help improve security and choice for the state’s government organizations. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 12:20 am


Optiv Security opens the Dallas Innovation and Fusion Center

, a security solutions integrator delivering end-to-end cybersecurity solutions across the globe, announced the opening of its new Dallas Innovation and Fusion Center, a state-of-the-art, more than 14,000-square-foot facility located in the HALL Park complex in Frisco, Texas. (more)

Posted on 22 July 2019 12:20 am


Brian Krebs - QuickBooks Cloud Hosting Firm iNSYNQ Hit in Ransomware Attack

QuickBooks Cloud Hosting Firm iNSYNQ Hit in Ransomware Attack Cloud hosting provider iNSYNQ says it is trying to recover from a ransomware attack that shut down its network and has left customers unable to access their accounting data for the past three days. (more)

Posted on 21 July 2019 8:19 pm


Personal data of users on 1111 job bank leaked on overseas forum

Taiwan job bank 1111 confirmed Friday that the personal data of its online members was hacked and leaked to a foreign-based hacker forum, and the case is now being investigated by local authorities. Henry Ho (何啟聖), vice president of 1111 job bank, said the scope of the personal data leakage has yet.... (more)

Posted on 21 July 2019 9:32 am


Iran-Linked APT34 Invites Victims to LinkedIn for Fresh Malware Infections

The group was posing as a researcher from Cambridge, and was found to have added three new malware families to its spy arsenal. A recent phishing campaign by Iran-linked threat actor APT34 made use of a savvy approach: Asking victims to join their social network. (more)

Posted on 21 July 2019 4:05 am


AA19-168A: Microsoft Operating Systems BlueKeep Vulnerability

Original release date: June 17, 2019 Summary The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is issuing this Activity Alert to provide information on a vulnerability, known as “BlueKeep,” that exists in the following Microsoft Windows Operating Systems (OSs), including both 32- and 64-bit versions, as well as all Service Pack versions: Windows 2000 Windows Vista Windows XP Windows 7 Windows Server 2003 Windows Server 2003 R2 Windows Server 2008 Windows Server 2008 R2 An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to take control of an affected system.      Technical Details BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708) exists within the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) used by the Microsoft Windows OSs listed above. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to perform remote code execution on an unprotected system.  According to Microsoft, an attacker can send specially crafted packets to one of these operating systems that has RDP enabled. [1] After successfully sending the packets, the attacker would have the ability to perform a number of actions: adding accounts with full user rights; viewing, changing, or deleting data; or installing programs. This exploit, which requires no user interaction, must occur before authentication to be successful. BlueKeep is considered “wormable” because malware exploiting this vulnerability on a system could propagate to other vulnerable systems; thus, a BlueKeep exploit would be capable of rapidly spreading in a fashion similar to the WannaCry malware attacks of 2017. [2] CISA has coordinated with external stakeholders and determined that Windows 2000 is vulnerable to BlueKeep. Mitigations CISA encourages users and administrators review the Microsoft Security Advisory [3] and the Microsoft Customer Guidance for CVE-2019-0708 [4] and apply the appropriate mitigation measures as soon as possible: Install available patches. Microsoft has released security updates to patch this vulnerability. Microsoft has also released patches for a number of OSs that are no longer officially supported, including Windows Vista, Windows XP, and Windows Server 2003. As always, CISA encourages users and administrators to test patches before installation. For OSs that do not have patches or systems that cannot be patched, other mitigation steps can be used to help protect against BlueKeep: Upgrade end-of-life (EOL) OSs. Consider upgrading any EOL OSs no longer supported by Microsoft to a newer, supported OS, such as Windows 10. Disable unnecessary services. Disable services not being used by the OS. This best practice limits exposure to vulnerabilities.   Enable Network Level Authentication. Enable Network Level Authentication in Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2. Doing so forces a session request to be authenticated and effectively mitigates against BlueKeep, as exploit of the vulnerability requires an unauthenticated session. Block Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 3389 at the enterprise perimeter firewall. Because port 3389 is used to initiate an RDP session, blocking it prevents an attacker from exploiting BlueKeep from outside the user’s network. However, this will block legitimate RDP sessions and may not prevent unauthenticated sessions from being initiated inside a network. References [1] Microsoft Security Advisory for CVE-2019-0708 [2] White House Press Briefing on the Attribution of the WannaCry Malware Attack to North Korea [3] Microsoft Security Advisory for CVE-2019-0708 [4] Microsoft Customer Guidance for CVE-2019-0708 Revisions June 17, 2019: Initial version June 17, 2019: Revised technical details section. This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy. (more)

Posted on 17 June 2019 1:37 pm


DICOM Standard in Medical Devices

NCCIC is aware of a public report of a vulnerability in the DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) standard with proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code. The DICOM standard is the international standard to transmit, store, retrieve, print, process, and display medical imaging information. According to this report, the vulnerability is exploitable by embedding executable code into the 128 byte preamble. This report was released without coordination with NCCIC or any known vendor. (more)

Posted on 11 June 2019 4:15 pm


AA19-122A: New Exploits for Unsecure SAP Systems

Original release date: May 2, 2019 | Last revised: May 3, 2019 Summary The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is issuing this activity alert in response to recently disclosed exploits that target unsecure configurations of SAP components. [ 1 ] Technical Details A presentation at the April 2019 Operation for Community Development and Empowerment (OPCDE) cybersecurity conference describes SAP systems with unsecure configurations exposed to the internet. Typically, SAP systems are not intended to be exposed to the internet as it is an untrusted network. Malicious cyber actors can attack and compromise these unsecure systems with publicly available exploit tools, termed “10KBLAZE.” The presentation details the new exploit tools and reports on systems exposed to the internet. SAP Gateway ACL The SAP Gateway allows non-SAP applications to communicate with SAP applications. If SAP Gateway access control lists (ACLs) are not configured properly (e.g., gw/acl_mode = 0), anonymous users can run operating system (OS) commands.[ 2 ] According to the OPCDE presentation, about 900 U.S. internet-facing systems were detected in this vulnerable condition. SAP Router secinfo The SAP router is a program that helps connect SAP systems with external networks. The default secinfo configuration for a SAP Gateway allows any internal host to run OS commands anonymously. If an attacker can access a misconfigured SAP router, the router can act as an internal host and proxy the attacker’s requests, which may result in remote code execution. According to the OPCDE presentation, 1,181 SAP routers were exposed to the internet. It is unclear if the exposed systems were confirmed to be vulnerable or were simply running the SAP router service. SAP Message Server SAP Message Servers act as brokers between Application Servers (AS). By default, Message Servers listen on a port 39XX and have no authentication. If an attacker can access a Message Server, they can redirect and/or execute legitimate man-in-the-middle (MITM) requests, thereby gaining credentials. Those credentials can be used to execute code or operations on AS servers (assuming the attacker can reach them). According to the OPCDE presentation, there are 693 Message Servers exposed to the internet in the United States. The Message Server ACL must be protected by the customer in all releases. Signature CISA worked with security researchers from Onapsis Inc.[ 3 ] to develop the following Snort signature that can be used to detect the exploits: alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"10KBLAZE SAP Exploit execute attempt"; flow:established,to_server; content:"|06 cb 03|"; offset:4; depth:3; content:"SAPXPG_START_XPG"; nocase; distance:0; fast_pattern; content:"37D581E3889AF16DA00A000C290099D0001"; nocase; distance:0; content:"extprog"; nocase; distance:0; sid:1; rev:1;)   Mitigations CISA recommends administrators of SAP systems implement the following to mitigate the vulnerabilities included in the OPCDE presentation: Ensure a secure configuration of their SAP landscape. Restrict access to SAP Message Server. Review SAP Notes 1408081 and 821875. Restrict authorized hosts via ACL files on Gateways ( gw/acl_mode and secinfo ) and Message Servers ( ms/acl_info ).[ 4 ], [ 5 ] Review SAP Note 1421005. Split MS internal/public: rdisp/msserv=0 rdisp/msserv_internal=39NN . [ 6 ] Restrict access to Message Server internal port ( tcp/39NN ) to clients or the internet. Enable Secure Network Communications (SNC) for clients. Scan for exposed SAP components. Ensure that SAP components are not exposed to the internet. Remove or secure any exposed SAP components. References [1] Comae Technologies: Operation for Community Development and Empowerment (OPCDE) Cybersecurity Conference Materials [2] SAP: Gateway Access Control Lists [3] Onapsis Inc. website [4] SAP Note 1408081 [5] SAP Note 821875 [6] SAP Note 1421005 Revisions May 2, 2019: Initial version This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy. (more)

Posted on 2 May 2019 10:54 pm


AA19-024A: DNS Infrastructure Hijacking Campaign

Original release date: January 24, 2019 | Last revised: February 13, 2019 Summary The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), part of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), is aware of a global Domain Name System (DNS) infrastructure hijacking campaign. Using compromised credentials, an attacker can modify the location to which an organization’s domain name resources resolve. This enables the attacker to redirect user traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure and obtain valid encryption certificates for an organization’s domain names, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks. See the following links for downloadable copies of open-source indicators of compromise (IOCs) from the sources listed in the References section below: IOCs (.csv) IOCs (.stix) Note: these files were last updated February 13, 2019, to remove the following three non-malicious IP addresses: 107.161.23.204 192.161.187.200 209.141.38.71 Technical Details Using the following techniques, attackers have redirected and intercepted web and mail traffic, and could do so for other networked services. The attacker begins by compromising user credentials, or obtaining them through alternate means, of an account that can make changes to DNS records. Next, the attacker alters DNS records, like Address (A), Mail Exchanger (MX), or Name Server (NS) records, replacing the legitimate address of a service with an address the attacker controls. This enables them to direct user traffic to their own infrastructure for manipulation or inspection before passing it on to the legitimate service, should they choose. This creates a risk that persists beyond the period of traffic redirection. Because the attacker can set DNS record values, they can also obtain valid encryption certificates for an organization’s domain names. This allows the redirected traffic to be decrypted, exposing any user-submitted data. Since the certificate is valid for the domain, end users receive no error warnings. Mitigations NCCIC recommends the following best practices to help safeguard networks against this threat: Update the passwords for all accounts that can change organizations’ DNS records. Implement multifactor authentication on domain registrar accounts, or on other systems used to modify DNS records. Audit public DNS records to verify they are resolving to the intended location. Search for encryption certificates related to domains and revoke any fraudulently requested certificates. References Cisco Talos blog: DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East CERT-OPMD blog: [DNSPIONAGE] – Focus on internal actions FireEye blog: Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale Crowdstrike blog: Widespread DNS Hijacking Activity Targets Multiple Sectors Revisions January 24, 2019: Initial version February 6, 2019: Updated IOCs, added Crowdstrike blog February 13, 2019: Updated IOCs This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy. (more)

Posted on 24 January 2019 8:01 pm


AA18-337A: SamSam Ransomware

Original release date: December 3, 2018 Summary The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are issuing this activity alert to inform computer network defenders about SamSam ransomware, also known as MSIL/Samas.A. Specifically, this product shares analysis of vulnerabilities that cyber actors exploited to deploy this ransomware. In addition, this report provides recommendations for prevention and mitigation. The SamSam actors targeted multiple industries, including some within critical infrastructure. Victims were located predominately in the United States, but also internationally. Network-wide infections against organizations are far more likely to garner large ransom payments than infections of individual systems. Organizations that provide essential functions have a critical need to resume operations quickly and are more likely to pay larger ransoms. The actors exploit Windows servers to gain persistent access to a victim’s network and infect all reachable hosts. According to reporting from victims in early 2016, cyber actors used the JexBoss Exploit Kit to access vulnerable JBoss applications. Since mid-2016, FBI analysis of victims’ machines indicates that cyber actors use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to gain persistent access to victims’ networks. Typically, actors either use brute force attacks or stolen login credentials. Detecting RDP intrusions can be challenging because the malware enters through an approved access point. After gaining access to a particular network, the SamSam actors escalate privileges for administrator rights, drop malware onto the server, and run an executable file, all without victims’ action or authorization. While many ransomware campaigns rely on a victim completing an action, such as opening an email or visiting a compromised website, RDP allows cyber actors to infect victims with minimal detection. Analysis of tools found on victims’ networks indicated that successful cyber actors purchased several of the stolen RDP credentials from known darknet marketplaces. FBI analysis of victims’ access logs revealed that the SamSam actors can infect a network within hours of purchasing the credentials. While remediating infected systems, several victims found suspicious activity on their networks unrelated to SamSam. This activity is a possible indicator that the victims’ credentials were stolen, sold on the darknet, and used for other illegal activity. SamSam actors leave ransom notes on encrypted computers. These instructions direct victims to establish contact through a Tor hidden service site. After paying the ransom in Bitcoin and establishing contact, victims usually receive links to download cryptographic keys and tools to decrypt their network. Technical Details NCCIC recommends organizations review the following SamSam Malware Analysis Reports. The reports represent four SamSam malware variants. This is not an exhaustive list. MAR-10219351.r1.v2 – SamSam1 MAR-10166283.r1.v1 – SamSam2 MAR-10158513.r1.v1 – SamSam3 MAR-10164494.r1.v1 – SamSam4 For general information on ransomware, see the NCCIC Security Publication at https://www.us-cert.gov/security-publications/Ransomware . Mitigations DHS and FBI recommend that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems. System owners and administrators should review any configuration changes before implementation to avoid unwanted impacts. Audit your network for systems that use RDP for remote communication. Disable the service if unneeded or install available patches. Users may need to work with their technology venders to confirm that patches will not affect system processes. Verify that all cloud-based virtual machine instances with public IPs have no open RDP ports, especially port 3389, unless there is a valid business reason to keep open RDP ports. Place any system with an open RDP port behind a firewall and require users to use a virtual private network (VPN) to access that system. Enable strong passwords and account lockout policies to defend against brute force attacks. Where possible, apply two-factor authentication. Regularly apply system and software updates. Maintain a good back-up strategy. Enable logging and ensure that logging mechanisms capture RDP logins. Keep logs for a minimum of 90 days and review them regularly to detect intrusion attempts. When creating cloud-based virtual machines, adhere to the cloud provider’s best practices for remote access. Ensure that third parties that require RDP access follow internal policies on remote access. Minimize network exposure for all control system devices. Where possible, disable RDP on critical devices. Regulate and limit external-to-internal RDP connections. When external access to internal resources is required, use secure methods such as VPNs. Of course, VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices. Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Scan for and remove suspicious email attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file header). Disable file and printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication. Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in Special Publication 800-83, Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling for Desktops and Laptops , from the National Institute of Standards and Technology. [1] Contact Information To report an intrusion and request resources for incident response or technical assistance, contact NCCIC, FBI, or the FBI’s Cyber Division via the following information: NCCIC NCCICCustomerService@hq.dhs.gov 888-282-0870 FBI’s Cyber Division CyWatch@fbi.gov 855-292-3937 FBI through a local field office Feedback DHS strives to make this report a valuable tool for our partners and welcomes feedback on how this publication could be improved. You can help by answering a few short questions about this report at the following URL: https://www.us-cert.gov/forms/feedback . References [1] NIST SP 800-83: Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling for Desktops and Laptops Revisions December 3, 2018: Initial version This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy. (more)

Posted on 3 December 2018 4:18 pm


TA18-331A: 3ve – Major Online Ad Fraud Operation

Original release date: November 27, 2018 Systems Affected Microsoft Windows Overview This joint Technical Alert (TA) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). DHS and FBI are releasing this TA to provide information about a major online ad fraud operation—referred to by the U.S. Government as "3ve"—involving the control of over 1.7 million unique Internet Protocol (IP) addresses globally, when sampled over a 10-day window. Description Online advertisers desire premium websites on which to publish their ads and large numbers of visitors to view those ads. 3ve created fake versions of both (websites and visitors), and funneled the advertising revenue to cyber criminals. 3ve obtained control over 1.7 million unique IPs by leveraging victim computers infected with Boaxxe/Miuref and Kovter malware, as well as Border Gateway Protocol-hijacked IP addresses.  Boaxxe/Miuref Malware Boaxxe malware is spread through email attachments and drive-by downloads. The ad fraud scheme that utilizes the Boaxxe botnet is primarily located in a data center. Hundreds of machines in this data center are browsing to counterfeit websites. When these counterfeit webpages are loaded into a browser, requests are made for ads to be placed on these pages. The machines in the data center use the Boaxxe botnet as a proxy to make requests for these ads. A command and control (C2) server sends instructions to the infected botnet computers to make the ad requests in an effort to hide their true data center IPs. Kovter Malware Kovter malware is also spread through email attachments and drive-by downloads. The ad fraud scheme that utilizes the Kovter botnet runs a hidden Chromium Embedded Framework (CEF) browser on the infected machine that the user cannot see. A C2 server tells the infected machine to visit counterfeit websites. When the counterfeit webpage is loaded in the hidden browser, requests are made for ads to be placed on these counterfeit pages. The infected machine receives the ads and loads them into the hidden browser. Impact For the indicators of compromise (IOCs) below, keep in mind that any one indicator on its own may not necessarily mean that a machine is infected. Some IOCs may be present for legitimate applications and network traffic as well, but are included here for completeness. Boaxxe/Miuref Malware Boaxxe malware leaves several executables on the infected machine. They may be found in one or more of the following locations: %UserProfile%\AppData\Local\VirtualStore\lsass.aaa %UserProfile%\AppData\Local\Temp\<RANDOM>.exe %UserProfile%\AppData\Local\<Random eight-character folder name>\<original file name>.exe The HKEY_CURRENT_USER (HKCU) “Run” key is set to the path to one of the executables created above. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\<Above path to executable>\ Kovter Malware Kovter malware is found mostly in the registry, but the following files may be found on the infected machine: %UserProfile\AppData\Local\Temp\<RANDOM> .exe/.bat %UserProfile%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\<RANDOM>\<RANDOM FILENAME>.exe %UserProfile%\AppData\Local\<RANDOM>\<RANDOM>.lnk %UserProfile%\AppData\Local\<RANDOM>\<RANDOM>.bat Kovter is known to hide in the registry under: HKCU\SOFTWARE\<RANDOM>\<RANDOM> The customized CEF browser is dropped to: %UserProfile%\AppData\Local\<RANDOM> The keys will look like random values and contain scripts. In some values, a User-Agent string can be clearly identified. An additional key containing a link to a batch script on the hard drive may be placed within registry key: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run There are several patterns in the network requests that are made by Kovter malware when visiting the counterfeit websites. The following are regex rules for these URL patterns: /?ptrackp=\d{5,8} /feedrs\d/click?feed_id=\d{1,5}&sub_id=\d{1,5}&cid=[a-f0-9-]*&spoof_domain=[\w\.\d-_]*&land_ip=\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3} /feedrs\d/vast_track?a=impression&feed_id=\d{5}&sub_id=\d{1,5}&sub2_id=\d{1,5}&cid=[a-f\d-] The following is a YARA rule for detecting Kovter: rule KovterUnpacked {   meta:     desc = "Encoded strings in unpacked Kovter samples."   strings:     $ = "7562@3B45E129B93"     $ = "@ouhKndCny"     $ = "@ouh@mmEdctffdsr"     $ = "@ouhSGQ"   condition:     all of them } Solution If you believe you may be a victim of 3ve and its associated malware or hijacked IPs, and have information that may be useful to investigators, submit your complaint to www.ic3.gov and use the hashtag 3ve (#3ve) in the body of your complaint. DHS and FBI advise users to take the following actions to remediate malware infections associated with Boaxxe/Miuref or Kovter: Use and maintain antivirus software. Antivirus software recognizes and protects your computer against most known viruses. Security companies are continuously updating their software to counter these advanced threats. Therefore, it is important to keep your antivirus software up-to-date. If you suspect you may be a victim of malware, update your antivirus software definitions and run a full-system scan. (See Understanding Anti-Virus Software for more information.) Avoid clicking links in email. Attackers have become very skilled at making phishing emails look legitimate. Users should ensure the link is legitimate by typing the link into a new browser. (See Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks .) Change your passwords. Your original passwords may have been compromised during the infection, so you should change them. (See Choosing and Protecting Passwords .) Keep your operating system and application software up-to-date. Install software patches so that attackers cannot take advantage of known problems or vulnerabilities. You should enable automatic updates of the operating system if this option is available. (See Understanding Patches and Software Updates  for more information.) Use anti-malware tools. Using a legitimate program that identifies and removes malware can help eliminate an infection. Users can consider employing a remediation tool... (more)

Posted on 27 November 2018 5:09 pm


AA18-284A: Publicly Available Tools Seen in Cyber Incidents Worldwide

Original release date: October 11, 2018 Summary This report is a collaborative research effort by the cyber security authorities of five nations: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] In it we highlight the use of five publicly available tools, which have been used for malicious purposes in recent cyber incidents around the world. The five tools are: Remote Access Trojan: JBiFrost Webshell: China Chopper Credential Stealer: Mimikatz Lateral Movement Framework: PowerShell Empire C2 Obfuscation and Exfiltration: HUC Packet Transmitter To aid the work of network defenders and systems administrators, we also provide advice on limiting the effectiveness of these tools and detecting their use on a network. The individual tools we cover in this report are limited examples of the types of tools used by threat actors. You should not consider this an exhaustive list when planning your network defense. Tools and techniques for exploiting networks and the data they hold are by no means the preserve of nation states or criminals on the dark web. Today, malicious tools with a variety of functions are widely and freely available for use by everyone from skilled penetration testers, hostile state actors and organized criminals, to amateur cyber criminals. The tools in this Activity Alert have been used to compromise information across a wide range of critical sectors, including health, finance, government, and defense. Their widespread availability presents a challenge for network defense and threat-actor attribution. Experience from all our countries makes it clear that, while cyber threat actors continue to develop their capabilities, they still make use of established tools and techniques. Even the most sophisticated threat actor groups use common, publicly available tools to achieve their objectives. Whatever these objectives may be, initial compromises of victim systems are often established through exploitation of common security weaknesses. Abuse of unpatched software vulnerabilities or poorly configured systems are common ways for a threat actor to gain access. The tools detailed in this Activity Alert come into play once a compromise has been achieved, enabling attackers to further their objectives within the victim’s systems. How to Use This Report The tools detailed in this Activity Alert fall into five categories: Remote Access Trojans (RATs), webshells, credential stealers, lateral movement frameworks, and command and control (C2) obfuscators. This Activity Alert provides an overview of the threat posed by each tool, along with insight into where and when it has been deployed by threat actors. Measures to aid detection and limit the effectiveness of each tool are also described. The Activity Alert concludes with general advice for improving network defense practices. Technical Details Remote Access Trojan: JBiFrost   First observed in May 2015, the JBiFrost RAT is a variant of the Adwind RAT, with roots stretching back to the Frutas RAT from 2012. A RAT is a program that, once installed on a victim’s machine, allows remote administrative control. In a malicious context, it can—among many other functions—be used to install backdoors and key loggers, take screen shots, and exfiltrate data. Malicious RATs can be difficult to detect because they are normally designed not to appear in lists of running programs and can mimic the behavior of legitimate applications. To prevent forensic analysis, RATs have been known to disable security measures (e.g., Task Manager) and network analysis tools (e.g., Wireshark) on the victim’s system. In Use JBiFrost RAT is typically employed by cyber criminals and low-skilled threat actors, but its capabilities could easily be adapted for use by state-sponsored threat actors. Other RATs are widely used by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actor groups, such as Adwind RAT, against the aerospace and defense sector; or Quasar RAT, by APT10, against a broad range of sectors. Threat actors have repeatedly compromised servers in our countries with the purpose of delivering malicious RATs to victims, either to gain remote access for further exploitation, or to steal valuable information such as banking credentials, intellectual property, or PII. Capabilities JBiFrost RAT is Java-based, cross-platform, and multifunctional. It poses a threat to several different operating systems, including Windows, Linux, MAC OS X, and Android. JBiFrost RAT allows threat actors to pivot and move laterally across a network or install additional malicious software. It is primarily delivered through emails as an attachment, usually an invoice notice, request for quotation, remittance notice, shipment notification, payment notice, or with a link to a file hosting service. Past infections have exfiltrated intellectual property, banking credentials, and personally identifiable information (PII). Machines infected with JBiFrost RAT can also be used in botnets to carry out distributed denial-of-service attacks. Examples Since early 2018, we have observed an increase in JBiFrost RAT being used in targeted attacks against critical national infrastructure owners and their supply chain operators. There has also been an increase in the RAT’s hosting on infrastructure located in our countries. In early 2017, Adwind RAT was deployed via spoofed emails designed to look as if they originated from Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, or SWIFT, network services. Many other publicly available RATs, including variations of Gh0st RAT, have also been observed in use against a range of victims worldwide. Detection and Protection Some possible indications of a JBiFrost RAT infection can include, but are not limited to: Inability to restart the computer in safe mode, Inability to open the Windows Registry Editor or Task Manager, Significant increase in disk activity and/or network traffic, Connection attempts to known malicious Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, and Creation of new files and directories with obfuscated or random names. Protection is best afforded by ensuring systems and installed applications are all fully patched and updated. The use of a modern antivirus program with automatic definition updates and regular system scans will also help ensure that most of the latest variants are stopped in their tracks. You should ensure that your organization is able to collect antivirus detections centrally across its estate and investigate RAT detections efficiently. Strict application whitelisting is recommended to prevent infections from occurring. The initial infection mechanism for RATs, including JBiFrost RAT, can be via phishing emails... (more)

Posted on 11 October 2018 3:19 pm


TA18-276B: Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Exploiting Managed Service Providers

Original release date: October 3, 2018 Systems Affected Network Systems Overview The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) is aware of ongoing APT actor activity attempting to infiltrate the networks of global managed service providers (MSPs). Since May 2016, APT actors have used various tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for the purposes of cyber espionage and intellectual property theft. APT actors have targeted victims in several U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including Information Technology (IT), Energy, Healthcare and Public Health, Communications, and Critical Manufacturing. This Technical Alert (TA) provides information and guidance to assist MSP customer network and system administrators with the detection of malicious activity on their networks and systems and the mitigation of associated risks. This TA includes an overview of TTPs used by APT actors in MSP network environments, recommended mitigation techniques, and information on reporting incidents. Description MSPs provide remote management of customer IT and end-user systems. The number of organizations using MSPs has grown significantly over recent years because MSPs allow their customers to scale and support their network environments at a lower cost than financing these resources internally. MSPs generally have direct and unfettered access to their customers’ networks, and may store customer data on their own internal infrastructure. By servicing a large number of customers, MSPs can achieve significant economies of scale. However, a compromise in one part of an MSP’s network can spread globally, affecting other customers and introducing risk. Using an MSP significantly increases an organization’s virtual enterprise infrastructure footprint and its number of privileged accounts, creating a larger attack surface for cyber criminals and nation-state actors. By using compromised legitimate MSP credentials (e.g., administration, domain, user), APT actors can move bidirectionally between an MSP and its customers’ shared networks. Bidirectional movement between networks allows APT actors to easily obfuscate detection measures and maintain a presence on victims’ networks. Note: NCCIC previously released information related to this activity in Alert TA17-117A: Intrusions Affecting Multiple Victims Across Multiple Sectors published on April 27, 2017, which includes indicators of compromise, signatures, suggested detection methods, and recommended mitigation techniques. Technical Details APT APT actors use a range of “living off the land” techniques to maintain anonymity while conducting their attacks. These techniques include using legitimate credentials and trusted off-the-shelf applications and pre-installed system tools present in MSP customer networks. Pre-installed system tools, such as command line scripts, are very common and used by system administrators for legitimate processes. Command line scripts are used to discover accounts and remote systems. PowerSploit is a repository of Microsoft PowerShell and Visual Basic scripts and uses system commands such as netsh . PowerSploit, originally developed as a legitimate penetration testing tool, is widely misused by APT actors. These scripts often cannot be blocked because they are legitimate tools, so APT actors can use them and remain undetected on victim networks. Although network defenders can generate log files, APT actors’ use of legitimate scripts makes it difficult to identify system anomalies and other malicious activity. When APT actors use system tools and common cloud services, it can also be difficult for network defenders to detect data exfiltration. APT actors have been observed using Robocopy—a Microsoft command line tool—to transfer exfiltrated and archived data from MSP client networks back through MSP network environments. Additionally, APT actors have been observed using legitimate PuTTY Secure Copy Client functions, allowing them to transfer stolen data securely and directly to third-party systems. Impact A successful network intrusion can have severe impacts to the affected organization, particularly if the compromise becomes public. Possible impacts include Temporary or permanent loss of sensitive or proprietary information, Disruption to regular operations, Financial losses to restore systems and files, and Potential harm to the organization’s reputation. Solution Detection Organizations should configure system logs to detect incidents and to identify the type and scope of malicious activity. Properly configured logs enable rapid containment and appropriate response. Response An organization’s ability to rapidly respond to and recover from an incident begins with the development of an incident response capability. An organization’s response capability should focus on being prepared to handle the most common attack vectors (e.g., spearphishing, malicious web content, credential theft). In general, organizations should prepare by Establishing and periodically updating an incident response plan. Establishing written guidelines that prioritize incidents based on mission impact, so that an appropriate response can be initiated. Developing procedures and out-of-band lines of communication to handle incident reporting for internal and external relationships. Exercising incident response measures for various intrusion scenarios regularly, as part of a training regime. Committing to an effort that secures the endpoint and network infrastructure: prevention is less costly and more effective than reacting after an incident. Mitigation Manage Supply Chain Risk MSP clients that do not conduct the majority of their own network defense should work with their MSP to determine what they can expect in terms of security. MSP clients should understand the supply chain risk associated with their MSP. Organizations should manage risk equally across their security, legal, and procurement groups. MSP clients should also refer to cloud security guidance from the National Institute of Standards and Technology to learn about MSP terms of service, architecture, security controls, and risks associated with cloud computing and data protection. [1] [2] [3] Architecture Restricting access to networks and systems is critical to containing an APT actor’s movement. Provided below are key items that organizations should implement and periodically audit to ensure their network environment’s physical and logical architecture limits an APT actor’s visibility and access. Virtual Private Network Connection Recommendations Use a dedicated Virtual Private Network (VPN) for MSP connection. The organization’s local network should connect to the MSP via a dedicated VPN... (more)

Posted on 3 October 2018 11:47 am


TA18-276A: Using Rigorous Credential Control to Mitigate Trusted Network Exploitation

Original release date: October 3, 2018 Systems Affected Network Systems Overview This technical alert addresses the exploitation of trusted network relationships and the subsequent illicit use of legitimate credentials by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors. It identifies APT actors' tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and describes the best practices that could be employed to mitigate each of them. The mitigations for each TTP are arranged according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework core functions of Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover. Description APT actors are using multiple mechanisms to acquire legitimate user credentials to exploit trusted network relationships in order to expand unauthorized access, maintain persistence, and exfiltrate data from targeted organizations. Suggested best practices for administrators to mitigate this threat include auditing credentials, remote-access logs, and controlling privileged access and remote access. Impact APT actors are conducting malicious activity against organizations that have trusted network relationships with potential targets, such as a parent company, a connected partner, or a contracted managed service provider (MSP). APT actors can use legitimate credentials to expand unauthorized access, maintain persistence, exfiltrate data, and conduct other operations, while appearing to be authorized users. Leveraging legitimate credentials to exploit trusted network relationships also allows APT actors to access other devices and other trusted networks, which affords intrusions a high level of persistence and stealth. Solution Recommended best practices for mitigating this threat include rigorous credential and privileged-access management, as well as remote-access control, and audits of legitimate remote-access logs. While these measures aim to prevent the initial attack vectors and the spread of malicious activity, there is no single proven threat response. Using a defense-in-depth strategy is likely to increase the odds of successfully disrupting adversarial objectives long enough to allow network defenders to detect and respond before the successful completion of a threat actor’s objectives. Any organization that uses an MSP to provide services should monitor the MSP's interactions within their organization’s enterprise networks, such as account use, privileges, and access to confidential or proprietary information. Organizations should also ensure that they have the ability to review their security and monitor their information hosted on MSP networks. APT TTPs and Corresponding Mitigations The following table displays the TTPs employed by APT actors and pairs them with mitigations that network defenders can implement. Table 1: APT TTPs and Mitigations APT TTPs Mitigations Preparation Allocate operational infrastructure, such as Internet Protocol addresses (IPs). Gather target credentials to use for legitimate access. Protect: Educate users to never click unsolicited links or open unsolicited attachments in emails. Implement an awareness and training program. Detect: Leverage multi-sourced threat-reputation services for files, Domain Name System (DNS), Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), IPs, and email addresses. Engagement Use legitimate remote access, such as virtual private networks (VPNs) and Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). Leverage a trusted relationship between networks. Protect: Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching end users. Authenticate inbound email using Sender Policy Framework; Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance; and DomainKeys Identified Mail to prevent email spoofing. Prevent external access via RDP sessions and require VPN access. Enforce multi-factor authentication and account-lockout policies to defend against brute force attacks. Detect: Leverage multi-sourced threat-reputation services for files, DNS, URLs, IPs, and email addresses. Scan all incoming and outgoing emails to detect threats and filter out executables. Audit all remote authentications from trusted networks or service providers for anomalous activity. Respond and Recover: Reset credentials, including system accounts. Transition to multifactor authentication and reduce use of password-based systems, which are susceptible to credential theft, forgery, and reuse across multiple systems. Presence Execution and Internal Reconnaissance: Write to disk and execute malware and tools on hosts. Use interpreted scripts and run commands in shell to enumerate accounts, local network, operating system, software, and processes for internal reconnaissance. Map accessible networks and scan connected targets. Lateral Movement: Use remote services and log on remotely. Use legitimate credentials to move laterally onto hosts, domain controllers, and servers. Write to remote file shares, such as Windows administrative shares. Credential Access: Locate credentials, dump credentials, and crack passwords. Protect: Deploy an anti-malware solution, which also aims to prevent spyware and adware. Prevent the execution of unauthorized software, such as Mimikatz, by using application whitelisting. Deploy PowerShell mitigations and, in the more current versions of PowerShell, enable monitoring and security features. Prevent unauthorized external access via RDP sessions. Restrict workstations from communicating directly with other workstations. Separate administrative privileges between internal administrator accounts and accounts used by trusted service providers. Enable detailed session-auditing and session-logging. Detect: Audit all remote authentications from trusted networks or service providers. Detect mismatches by correlating credentials used within internal networks with those employed on external-facing systems. Log use of system administrator commands, such as net, ipconfig, and ping. Audit logs for suspicious behavior. Use whitelist or baseline comparison to monitor Windows event logs and network traffic to detect when a user maps a privileged administrative share on a Windows system. Leverage multi-sourced threat-reputation services for files, DNS, URLs, IPs, and email addresses. Respond and Recover: Reset credentials. Monitor accounts associated with a compromise for abnormal behaviors, including unusual connections to nonstandard resources or attempts to elevate privileges, enumerate, or execute unexpected programs or applications. Effect Maintain access to trusted networks while gathering data from victim networks... (more)

Posted on 3 October 2018 11:00 am


TA18-275A: HIDDEN COBRA – FASTCash Campaign

Original release date: October 2, 2018 | Last revised: December 21, 2018 Systems Affected Retail Payment Systems Overview This joint Technical Alert (TA) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Working with U.S. government partners, DHS, Treasury, and FBI identified malware and other indicators of compromise (IOCs) used by the North Korean government in an Automated Teller Machine (ATM) cash-out scheme—referred to by the U.S. Government as “FASTCash.” The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity, visit https://www.us-cert.gov/hiddencobra . FBI has high confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using the IOCs listed in this report to maintain a presence on victims’ networks to enable network exploitation. DHS, FBI, and Treasury are distributing these IOCs to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government malicious cyber activity. This TA also includes suggested response actions to the IOCs provided, recommended mitigation techniques, and information on reporting incidents. If users or administrators detect activity associated with the malware families associated with FASTCash, they should immediately flag it, report it to the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give it the highest priority for enhanced mitigation. NCCIC conducted analysis on 10 malware samples related to this activity and produced a Malware Analysis Report (MAR). MAR-10201537, HIDDEN COBRA FASTCash-Related Malware, examines the tactics, techniques, and procedures observed in the malware. Visit the MAR-10201537 page for the report and associated IOCs. Description Since at least late 2016, HIDDEN COBRA actors have used FASTCash tactics to target banks in Africa and Asia. At the time of this TA’s publication, the U.S. Government has not confirmed any FASTCash incidents affecting institutions within the United States. FASTCash schemes remotely compromise payment switch application servers within banks to facilitate fraudulent transactions. The U.S. Government assesses that HIDDEN COBRA actors will continue to use FASTCash tactics to target retail payment systems vulnerable to remote exploitation. According to a trusted partner’s estimation, HIDDEN COBRA actors have stolen tens of millions of dollars. In one incident in 2017, HIDDEN COBRA actors enabled cash to be simultaneously withdrawn from ATMs located in over 30 different countries. In another incident in 2018, HIDDEN COBRA actors enabled cash to be simultaneously withdrawn from ATMs in 23 different countries.   HIDDEN COBRA actors target the retail payment system infrastructure within banks to enable fraudulent ATM cash withdrawals across national borders. HIDDEN COBRA actors have configured and deployed malware on compromised switch application servers in order to intercept and reply to financial request messages with fraudulent but legitimate-looking affirmative response messages. Although the infection vector is unknown, all of the compromised switch application servers were running unsupported IBM Advanced Interactive eXecutive (AIX) operating system versions beyond the end of their service pack support dates; there is no evidence HIDDEN COBRA actors successfully exploited the AIX operating system in these incidents. HIDDEN COBRA actors exploited the targeted systems by using their knowledge of International Standards Organization (ISO) 8583—the standard for financial transaction messaging—and other tactics. HIDDEN COBRA actors most likely deployed ISO 8583 libraries on the targeted switch application servers. Malicious threat actors use these libraries to help interpret financial request messages and properly construct fraudulent financial response messages. Figure 1: Anatomy of a FASTCash scheme A review of log files showed HIDDEN COBRA actors making typos and actively correcting errors while configuring the targeted server for unauthorized activity. Based on analysis of the affected systems, analysts believe that malware—used by HIDDEN COBRA actors and explained in the Technical Details section below—inspected inbound financial request messages for specific primary account numbers (PANs). The malware generated fraudulent financial response messages only for the request messages that matched the expected PANs. Most accounts used to initiate the transactions had minimal account activity or zero balances. Analysts believe HIDDEN COBRA actors blocked transaction messages to stop denial messages from leaving the switch and used a GenerateResponse* function to approve the transactions. These response messages were likely sent for specific PANs matched using CheckPan() verification (see figure 1 for additional details on CheckPan() ). Technical Details HIDDEN COBRA actors used malicious Windows executable applications, command-line utility applications, and other files in the FASTCash campaign to perform transactions and interact with financial systems, including the switch application server. The initial infection vector used to compromise victim networks is unknown; however, analysts surmise HIDDEN COBRA actors used spear-phishing emails in targeted attacks against bank employees. HIDDEN COBRA actors likely used Windows-based malware to explore a bank’s network to identify the payment switch application server. Although these threat actors used different malware in each known incident, static analysis of malware samples indicates similarities in malware capabilities and functionalities. HIDDEN COBRA actors likely used legitimate credentials to move laterally through a bank’s network and to illicitly access the switch application server. This pattern suggests compromised systems within a bank’s network were used to access and compromise the targeted payment switch application server. Upon successful compromise of a bank’s payment switch application server, HIDDEN COBRA actors likely injected malicious code into legitimate processes—using command-line utility applications on the payment switch application server—to enable fraudulent behavior by the system in response to what would otherwise be normal payment switch application server activity. NCCIC collaborated with Symantec cybersecurity researchers to provide additional context on existing analysis [1] . Malware samples analyzed included malicious AIX executable files intended for a proprietary UNIX operating system developed by IBM. The AIX executable files were designed to inject malicious code into a currently running process. Two of the AIX executable files are configured with an export function, which allows malicious applications to perform transactions on financial systems using the ISO 8583 standard... (more)

Posted on 2 October 2018 3:45 pm


TA18-201A: Emotet Malware

Original release date: July 20, 2018 Systems Affected Network Systems Overview Emotet is an advanced, modular banking Trojan that primarily functions as a downloader or dropper of other banking Trojans. Emotet continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments, and the private and public sectors. This joint Technical Alert (TA) is the result of Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) analytic efforts, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). Description Emotet continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting SLTT governments. Its worm-like features result in rapidly spreading network-wide infection, which are difficult to combat. Emotet infections have cost SLTT governments up to $1 million per incident to remediate. Emotet is an advanced, modular banking Trojan that primarily functions as a downloader or dropper of other banking Trojans. Additionally, Emotet is a polymorphic banking Trojan that can evade typical signature-based detection. It has several methods for maintaining persistence, including auto-start registry keys and services. It uses modular Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) to continuously evolve and update its capabilities. Furthermore, Emotet is Virtual Machine-aware and can generate false indicators if run in a virtual environment. Emotet is disseminated through malspam (emails containing malicious attachments or links) that uses branding familiar to the recipient; it has even been spread using the MS-ISAC name. As of July 2018, the most recent campaigns imitate PayPal receipts, shipping notifications, or “past-due” invoices purportedly from MS-ISAC. Initial infection occurs when a user opens or clicks the malicious download link, PDF, or macro-enabled Microsoft Word document included in the malspam. Once downloaded, Emotet establishes persistence and attempts to propagate the local networks through incorporated spreader modules. Figure 1: Malicious email distributing Emotet Currently, Emotet uses five known spreader modules: NetPass.exe, WebBrowserPassView, Mail PassView, Outlook scraper, and a credential enumerator. NetPass.exe is a legitimate utility developed by NirSoft that recovers all network passwords stored on a system for the current logged-on user. This tool can also recover passwords stored in the credentials file of external drives. Outlook scraper is a tool that scrapes names and email addresses from the victim’s Outlook accounts and uses that information to send out additional phishing emails from the compromised accounts. WebBrowserPassView is a password recovery tool that captures passwords stored by Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Safari, and Opera and passes them to the credential enumerator module. Mail PassView is a password recovery tool that reveals passwords and account details for various email clients such as Microsoft Outlook, Windows Mail, Mozilla Thunderbird, Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail, and Gmail and passes them to the credential enumerator module. Credential enumerator is a self-extracting RAR file containing two components: a bypass component and a service component. The bypass component is used for the enumeration of network resources and either finds writable share drives using Server Message Block (SMB) or tries to brute force user accounts, including the administrator account. Once an available system is found, Emotet writes the service component on the system, which writes Emotet onto the disk. Emotet’s access to SMB can result in the infection of entire domains (servers and clients). Figure 2: Emotet infection process To maintain persistence, Emotet injects code into explorer.exe and other running processes. It can also collect sensitive information, including system name, location, and operating system version, and connects to a remote command and control server (C2), usually through a generated 16-letter domain name that ends in “.eu.” Once Emotet establishes a connection with the C2, it reports a new infection, receives configuration data, downloads and runs files, receives instructions, and uploads data to the C2 server. Emotet artifacts are typically found in arbitrary paths located off of the AppData\Local and AppData\Roaming directories. The artifacts usually mimic the names of known executables. Persistence is typically maintained through Scheduled Tasks or via registry keys. Additionally, Emotet creates randomly-named files in the system root directories that are run as Windows services. When executed, these services attempt to propagate the malware to adjacent systems via accessible administrative shares. Note: it is essential that privileged accounts are not used to log in to compromised systems during remediation as this may accelerate the spread of the malware. Example Filenames and Paths: C:\Users\<username>\AppData \Local\Microsoft\Windows\shedaudio.exe C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Macromedia\Flash Player\macromedia\bin\flashplayer.exe Typical Registry Keys: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run System Root Directories: C:\Windows\11987416.exe C:\Windows\System32\46615275.exe C:\Windows\System32\shedaudio.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\f9jwqSbS.exe Impact Negative consequences of Emotet infection include temporary or permanent loss of sensitive or proprietary information, disruption to regular operations, financial losses incurred to restore systems and files, and potential harm to an organization’s reputation. Solution NCCIC and MS-ISAC recommend that organizations adhere to the following general best practices to limit the effect of Emotet and similar malspam: Use Group Policy Object to set a Windows Firewall rule to restrict inbound SMB communication between client systems. If using an alternative host-based intrusion prevention system (HIPS), consider implementing custom modifications for the control of client-to-client SMB communication. At a minimum, create a Group Policy Object that restricts inbound SMB connections to clients originating from clients. Use antivirus programs, with automatic updates of signatures and software, on clients and servers. Apply appropriate patches and updates immediately (after appropriate testing). Implement filters at the email gateway to filter out emails with known malspam indicators, such as known malicious subject lines, and block suspicious IP addresses at the firewall... (more)

Posted on 20 July 2018 9:24 pm


Meltdown and Spectre Vulnerabilities (Update J)

This updated alert is a follow-up to the updated alert titled ICS-ALERT-18-011-01 Meltdown and Spectre Vulnerabilities (Update I) that was published September 11, 2018, on the NCCIC/ICS-CERT website. (more)

Posted on 11 January 2018 5:51 pm


WAGO PFC200

NCCIC is aware of a public report of an improper authentication vulnerability affecting WAGO PFC200, a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) device. According to this report, the vulnerability is exploitable by sending a TCP payload on the bound port. This report was released after attempted coordination with WAGO. NCCIC has notified the affected vendor of the report and has asked the vendor to confirm the vulnerability and identify mitigations. NCCIC is issuing this alert to provide notice of the report and identify baseline mitigations for reducing risks to these and other cybersecurity attacks. (more)

Posted on 7 December 2017 9:11 pm


Eaton ELCSoft Vulnerabilities

NCCIC/ICS-CERT is aware of a public report of buffer overflow vulnerabilities affecting Eaton ELCSoft, a PLC programming software for Eaton Logic Control (ELC) controllers. According to the public report, which was coordinated with ICS-CERT prior to its public release, researcher Ariele Caltabiano (kimiya) working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative, identified that an attacker can leverage these vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code in the context of the process. ICS-CERT has notified the affected vendor, who has reported that they are planning to address the vulnerabilities. No timeline has been provided. ICS-CERT is issuing this alert to provide notice of the report and to identify baseline mitigations for reducing risks to these and other cybersecurity attacks. (more)

Posted on 4 August 2017 7:11 pm


CAN Bus Standard Vulnerability

NCCIC/ICS-CERT is aware of a public report of a vulnerability in the Controller Area Network (CAN) Bus standard with proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code affecting CAN Bus, a broadcast based network standard. According to the public report, which was coordinated with ICS-CERT prior to its public release, researchers Andrea Palanca, Eric Evenchick, Federico Maggi, and Stefano Zanero identified a vulnerability exploiting a weakness in the CAN protocol that allows an attacker to perform a denial-of-service (DoS) attack. (more)

Posted on 28 July 2017 7:34 pm


CRASHOVERRIDE Malware

CRASHOVERRIDE, aka, Industroyer, is the fourth family of malware publically identified as targeting industrial control systems (ICS). It uses a modular design, with payloads that target several industrial communication protocols and are capable of directly controlling switches and circuit breakers. Additional modules include a data-wiping component and a module capable of causing a denial of service (DoS) to Siemens SIPROTEC devices. (more)

Posted on 25 July 2017 4:45 pm


Petya Malware Variant (Update C)

This updated alert is a follow-up to the updated alert titled ICS-ALERT-17-181-01B Petya Malware Variant that was published July 5, 2017, on the NCCIC/ICS-CERT web site. ICS-CERT is aware of reports of a variant of the Petya malware that is affecting several countries. ICS-CERT is releasing this alert to enhance the awareness of critical infrastructure asset owners/operators about the Petya variant and to identify product vendors that have issued recommendations to mitigate the risk associated with this malware. (more)

Posted on 30 June 2017 9:09 pm


Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware (Update I)

This updated alert is a follow-up to the updated alert titled ICS-ALERT-17-135-01H Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware that was published May 31, 2017, on the NCCIC/ICS-CERT web site. (more)

Posted on 15 May 2017 11:16 pm


BrickerBot Permanent Denial-of-Service Attack (Update A)

This updated alert is a follow-up to the original alert titled ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A BrickerBot Permanent Denial-of-Service Attack that was published April 12, 2017, on the NCCIC/ICS-CERT web site. ICS-CERT is aware of open-source reports of “BrickerBot” attacks, which exploit hard-coded passwords in IoT devices in order to cause a permanent denial of service (PDoS). This family of botnets, which consists of BrickerBot.1 and BrickerBot.2, was described in a Radware Attack Report. (more)

Posted on 12 April 2017 3:02 pm


Miele Professional PG 8528 Vulnerability

NCCIC/ICS-CERT is aware of a public report of a directory traversal vulnerability with proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code affecting the embedded webserver (“PST10 WebServer”) in Miele Professional PG 8528, a large capacity washer and disinfector used in hospitals and laboratory settings to disinfect medical and laboratory equipment. According to this report, the vulnerability is remotely exploitable. (more)

Posted on 30 March 2017 2:10 pm



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